AGENDA

First Meeting of the SCC/Subcommittee on PRM-11, Task 2 17 March 1977 (1300-1430 hours)

I. DCI Opening Comments

II. Discussion

- A. General Comments on PRM-11
- B. Task 2 Organization
- C. Task 2 Outline
- D. Relationship of Task 2 to Task 3
- E. Any Other Issues from Members

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PRM-11, Task 2

ORGANIZATION

GROUP	COMPOSITION	FUNCTIONS
SCC Subcommittee	DCI State OSD JCS NSC	 Overall Direction Resolution of drafting issues on which WG does not agree
Working Group	IC Staff State NSC CIA OSD DIA NSA NIO Appropriate Community Members	 Structured discussion of issues Oversee drafting of Task 2 report
Executive Secretariat	IC Staff, assisted as appropriate by Community elements	Draft the reportTask 2 administrative matters

Approved For Release 2005/1721 CIA-RDP79M00095A066100040014-5

Outline PRM 11, Task 2

16 March Revision

The Role of the DCI:
Responsibilities, Authorities and Problems

Purpose

To develop a thorough but brief description and analysis of the role of the DCI, including identification and critique of problem areas.

Scope and Emphasis

The study will consider all DCI roles, but will emphasize a) DCI interaction with other departments, especially DoD and State, and b) issues where DCI responsibilities and powers appear to be out of balance.

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Outline: PRM 11, Task 2

- I. Introduction
 - A. Historical retrospect
 - B. How management structure affects performance
 - C. The organizational setting: a brief description of the scope of present day intelligence activities.
- II. The Statutory Authority of the DCI and other Government Officials in the Intelligence Arena
 - A. The DCI
 - B. The Secretary of Defense
 - C. The Secretary of State and Director, ACDA
 - D. Others
 - E. Congressional and Executive directives
 - F. De facto roles -- activities not covered by statute
- III. Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities of the DCI
 - A. The DCI as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisor
 - 1. Advisor on policy
 - 2. Spokesman on substance
 - 3. Spokesman on operations
 - 4. Spokesman on the NFIP and budget
 - B. The DCI as Producer of National Intelligence
 - 1. What is national intelligence
 - 2. NIEs and the national estimates process
 - 3. Current national intelligence
 - 4. Warning and crisis-related intelligence
 - C. The DCI as Head of the Intelligence Community
 - 1. A large role in flux
 - 2. Community mechanisms
 - a. The NFIB and its subcommittees
 - b. The NIOs
 - c. The Intelligence Community Staff
 - d. The DCI Planning System (Perspectives, DCID 1/2, etc.)
 - e. PRC (CFI)
 - 3. Non-Community mechanisms affecting the DCI
 - a. NSC level (e.g., PRC-PRMs, SCC, NSC reviews)

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- b. DoD (e.g., DDI/ASD(I), program-budget
 process)
- c. State (e.g., Mode process, covert action approvals)
- D. The DCI as Head of the CIA
 - 1. Executive management
 - a. Production
 - b. Collection
 - c. R&D
 - d. Covert action
 - 2. CIA in the Intelligence Community
 - a. Services of common concern
 - b. Dependence on other departments

IV. Management Problems

- A. Problems in Collection, Processing, Analysis and Production
 - 1. Establishing user needs
 - 2. Setting priorities and requirements
 - 3. Tasking and operational controls
 - 4. Producing national intelligence
 - 5. Meeting departmental product needs
 - 6. Net assessment
 - 7. I&W and crisis support
 - 8. The national-tactical relationship
 - 9. The peace-war dichotomy
 - 10. Compartmentation and dissemination
 - 11. Performance evaluation
- B. Problems in Programming and Budgeting
 - 1. Planning and requirements: Do needs or capabilities drive programs?
 - Programming and budgeting: The process of deciding
 - 3. Programming and budgeting: The process of defending to OMB, President, Congress
 - 4. Intelligence related activities
 - 5. Data, access, and authority

V. Other DCI Roles

- A. As protector of sources and methods
- B. As guarantor of propriety
- C. As counterintelligence participant
- D. As public spokesman
- E. Foreign liaison

VII. Conclusions

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP79M00095A000100040014-5 SECRET/XGDS (2) February 22, 1977

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-11

TO:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Energy Research
and Development Administration
The US Representative to the United
Nations

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SUBJECT:

· Intelligence Structure and Mission

I have directed that the NSC Special Coordination Committee undertake a comprehensive review of major foreign intelligence activities and the organizational structure and functioning of the Intelligence Community.

This review will be undertaken in the following manner:

- 1. A subcommittee of the SCC under the direction of the Attorney General shall review the adequacy of existing laws, Executive Orders, National Security Council Intelligence Directives and Departmental Directives, including:
 - -- Legal sanctions for the protection of sources and methods and the issues raised by the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act.
 - -- Legislation that both protects the civil rights of U.S. persons and provides for appropriate collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence through electronic and physical surveillance, and

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-- The need for statutory charters for all foreign intelligence agencies.

- 2. Under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, a subcommittee of the SCC shall review the responsibilities and powers of the Director of Central Intelligence in his role as Foreign Intelligence Advisor to the President, central authority for the production of national intelligence and manager of the national foreign intelligence program and budget. This examination should include an analysis of the mechanisms for:
 - -- planning, evaluating and improving the Intelligence Community performance;
 - -- identifying intelligence requirements and tasking all sources;
 - -- processing, analyzing, producing and distributing intelligence for anticipated activities, warning, crisis support, current and estimative intelligence and net assessments;
 - -- evaluating intelligence production performance.
- 3. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Special Coordination Committee should undertake a complete assessment of Executive Order 11905 in light of the experience gained over the last year, including:
 - -- Evaluation of the performance, capacity and procedural problems regarding the former Committee on Foreign Intelligence and Operations Advisory Group, as well as the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community Staff to act as effective instruments for control, direction and management of the Intelligence Community.
 - -- An assessment of the role and effectiveness of oversight organizations and the impact of Executive Order 11905 restrictions, and associated guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General on foreign intelligence activities.

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- of responsibility and management relationships in terms of organizational structure, efficiency and utility. All elements of the National Intelligence Program (NFIP) and Defense Intelligence activities coming under the cognizance of the Director for Defense Intelligence should be included as well as the roles of the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the DCI interagency committee structure.
- -- An analysis of national counterintelligence policies and coordinating mechanisms.

This assessment should present alternative options for dealing with the above issues. These options should address, but need not be limited to:

- -- Preserving and improving present arrangements under Executive Order 11905, as amended.
- -- Adding to the line of authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over national intelligence collection programs.
- -- Separating the role of the Director of Central Intelligence as community manager from the role of the Director of Central Intelligence.
- -- Separating Central Intelligence analysis and production from all collection, operational and intelligence-related research and development activities.

The final report should be completed by June 1, 1977.

Interretationships among the socious intelligence agencies will be assessed by seld recommendations made to me by the SCC as a whofe.

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DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Chairman

E. H. Knoche Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

John N. McMahon Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

OSD

David E. McGiffert Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs - Designate

Thomas K. Latimer
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence)/Director of Defense Intelligence

JCS

Admiral Bobby R. Inman Vice Director for Plans, Operations, and Support, DIA

State

Harold Saunders Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Emerson Brown
Assistant Deputy Director for Coordination, INR

NSC

Samuel Hoskinson NSC Staff Member

Colonel Robert A. Rosenberg NSC Staff Member

Executive Secretary

Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, ICS

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record Contents of book given out at 17 March 1977 Subcommittee meeting at OEOB. Date SORM 101 USE PREVIOUS